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ABSTRACT
This study examines whether manufacturing firm’s preference for use of 
past or future period sales information in determining inventory production 
is associated with two country level variables – management control 
system score and shareholder protection level. This study uses archival 
data to empirically examine the association between inventory production 
and sales information across twenty countries with different management 
control system score measured by Bloom et al. (2012) and different 
shareholder protection level measured by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and 
Djankov et al. (2008). This study finds that the entire sample experience 
a positive association between current period inventory production and 
future period sales change and no association between current period 
inventory production and past period sales change, suggesting that firms 
generally use future or projected sales change information instead of past 
sales change information in making production decisions. The study further 
shows that, after partitioning the sample based on country characteristics, 
the reliance on the future sales change information appears greater when 
firms are in countries with low management control system score or with 
high shareholder protection level. This study uses a large sample to gauge 
systematic differences in the use of management accounting information in 
inventory production across countries. The results suggest that less emphasis 
on management control (which may indicate greater emphasis on decision-
making) and high shareholder protection level have a positive effect on the 
firm’s preference of future information. 
Keywords: past or future sales information, management control, 
shareholder protection, inventory production
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INTRODUCTION
This study empirically examines the association between current period 
inventory production and adjacent past or future period sales activities in 
manufacturing firms across twenty different countries. In this study, we 
conjecture that in scheduling inventory production to meet sales demand, 
in addition to the employment of contemporaneous sales information, some 
firms may also consider future sales change information, while others may 
consider past sales change information instead. Such different patterns or 
preferences of information in inventory production might be associated 
with the business environment at a country level. 
Management accounting information used in decision-making should 
be forward-looking and differential to be relevant. On the other hand, another 
management accounting information function—control—prefers verifiable 
past information (Zimmerman, 2013). Future information is usually more 
difficult and expensive to acquire and less reliable or verifiable than past 
information. Thus, preference of either type of information indicates some 
trade-off considerations.
Contingency theory posits that good management accounting practices 
vary contingent on many factors, and there is no universally agreed upon 
optimal set of accounting methods and practices that are suitable for all firms 
(Otley, 1980, 2016). In this paper, archival data from twenty countries is 
used to examine whether firms’ employment of past period sales change or 
future period sales change information in inventory production is associated 
with two country-level variables—management control system score and 
shareholder protection degree, and such variations indicate different styles 
or emphases of inventory management practices prevailing in different 
countries. 
The first country-level variable is management control practices 
(Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007, 2010; Bloom et al., 2012). The management 
control systems and practices vary across countries. Culture, tradition, 
history, state of economic development, and many other country elements 
jointly determine what management practices are considered the most 
needed, useful, and value-added by firms in these countries (Bloom & Van 
Reenen, 2010). Thus, in addition to idiosyncratic firm characteristics, firms 
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operating in the same country with the same external business environments 
may form a consensus regarding the optimal management philosophy and 
practices. 
Bloom et al. (2012) examine management practice differences across 
countries to explain the different productivity by surveying 9,079 firms 
from twenty countries and formulate scores in three categories: monitoring 
management, targets management, and incentives management. Following 
the notion that management control system influences management 
accounting (Anthony & Govindarajan, 2006), we attempt to examine 
whether these management practice scores affect which type of accounting 
information, past or future sales change, is associated with the inventory 
production. 
The second country characteristic considered is shareholder protection 
level (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; Djankov et al., 2008). We examine whether 
managerial accounting practices of using past or future sales change 
information in inventory production are related to the different levels of 
shareholder protection across countries (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Djankov 
et al., 2008). 
Agency theory helps shape managerial accounting (Zimmerman, 
2013). In responding to different principal-agent problems between 
shareholders and managers and between top-level managers and lower-level 
managers, the managerial accounting practices and methods are likely to 
differ in providing useful information to facilitate the reduction of agency 
conflicts and costs, and hence maximize firm value. The management control 
need for past information and the decision-making need for the future 
information may vary across countries with different levels of shareholder 
protection. Thus, shareholder protection to reduce the agency problems 
could influence the type of management accounting information used in 
production decision-making.
We identify twenty countries from the intersection of samples used 
in Bloom et al. (2012) and Djankov et al. (2008) and measure inventory 
production for each firm-year observation based on cost of goods sold 
adjusted for inventory change. This study first finds a positive association 
between current period inventory production and future period sales change, 
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but no association between current period inventory production and past 
period sales change in the entire sample, suggesting that firms generally use 
future or projected sales change information instead of past sales change in 
making production decisions. 
The sample is then partitioned based on the median country-level 
management score (Bloom et al., 2012). The association between production 
and future period sales appears greater in the low management score sub-
sample, but not statistically higher than that of the high management score 
sub-sample. Additionally, we find a negative association between inventory 
production and past period sales change only in the high management score 
sub-sample.
The sample is also partitioned based on the median country-level 
shareholder protection level (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Djankov et 
al., 2008). We find that the association between production and future 
period sales change in the high shareholder protection level sub-sample is 
statistically higher than that of the low shareholder protection level sub-
sample. We also find a negative association between production and past 
period sales change only in the low shareholder protection level sub-sample. 
Finally, we use the medians of both country characteristics variables 
to form four sub-samples to examine the association between current 
period production and sales change in the adjacent periods. We find that 
the positive association between current period production and future sales 
change information exists only in the sub-sample with high shareholder 
protection level and low total management score or the sub-sample with 
high total management score and low shareholder protection level. The 
other two sub-samples with two country characteristics variables at both 
low levels or high levels do not present such association. 
We contribute to the extant research by using archival data to gauge 
systematic differences in use of management accounting information in 
inventory production across countries. Extant research on managerial 
accounting practices are mostly field study or survey study because large 
archival data sets for individual firms are not available on a large scale 
to conduct empirical study. Managerial accounting is local to a firm and 
difficult to capture not only empirically but also cross-sectionally. This 
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research attempts to capture a common business or accounting strategy 
used by firms with common country characteristics. 
Accounting research in an international setting mostly focuses on 
external financial accounting. While financial accounting research is 
extensive with many interesting and informative findings, prior research 
on international management accounting, particularly empirical research, 
is very limited.  Prior financial accounting research (e.g. Ball et al., 2000, 
Ball et al., 2003) shows that institutional differences drive the financial 
accounting outcomes to differ across countries despite the same or similar 
set of accounting standards. Similarly, we contribute to management 
accounting research by studying the impact of country-level characteristics 
on management accounting practices.
Our research could be of interest to supply chain management 
research as well. Since management accounting is an integral component 
of management control practices, and inventory management is important 
in the supply chain, our study could shed some light on how accounting 
information facilitates management control differently across countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews 
prior research, and develops the research questions. Section 3 describes the 
research design. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the sample selection and results. 
The last section concludes.
PRIOR LITERATURE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Management Accounting Practices/Techniques Over Time/
Across Countries
The development of management accounting practices accompanies 
the modernization of industrial firms and the increased complexity in 
managing such firms. The new techniques and practices are invented to solve 
or cope with a specific problem, and often result in improved operational 
results. These advancements in good management accounting practices then 
disseminate to other firms, industries, and countries, if similar problems 
arise. Nevertheless, not all good practices can be applied universally. 
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According to value-added management, management accounting 
practices are considered good when they contribute to firm value/shareholder 
value, and according to contingency theory, good practices are contingent on 
many factors. Ittner and Larcker (2001) state that, “No universally applicable 
system of management and control—the choice of appropriate accounting 
and control techniques depends upon the circumstances surrounding an 
organization. Among the prominent contingent factors in this literature are 
the external environment, technology, competitive strategy and mission, 
business unit and industry characteristics, and knowledge and observability 
factors.”
The adoption of new and more advanced management accounting 
practices is influenced not only by firms’ idiosyncrasies, but also by their 
home country characteristics. For example, Macarthur (2006) points out 
that a noted factor about the long-term success of German management 
accounting systems is the impact of “German culture and practices.” 
Compared to the US, Germany is classified as a strong uncertainty avoidance 
country with a low tolerance for uncertainty (Macarthur, 2006). Although 
both the US and Germany are developed Western economies with superior 
management practices, the variations in the national cultural characteristics 
between the two countries led to differences in the approach to management 
accounting (Macarthur, 2006). 
When comparing actual management accounting techniques used in 
practices across countries of different economies, researchers surprisingly 
find that similar techniques are used in not only different developed 
countries, but also imported or adopted in less developed countries. Hopper 
et al. (2009) reviewed research on management accounting in developing 
countries and found that there are no management accounting techniques 
unique to less developed countries, and no different accounting techniques 
used in rich and poor countries.
However, application of same techniques across country appears to 
differ. For example, Shileds et al. (1991) compare Japanese and US firms 
and find many subtle differences: US firms distinguish variable overhead 
and fixed overhead in more cases than Japan; US firms are more diverse in 
budget revision intervals than Japan; US firms use standard costs less for 
budgeting than Japan and emphasize more on the past; in setting standard 
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costs, Japanese firms tend to use standards that focus on future performance 
while US firms rely on currently attainable and average past performance. 
Another study, Krumwiede and Suessmair (2007) find that, compared to 
the US firms, German firms have a longer-term planning horizon, are more 
likely to use the direct costing, and are more likely to adopt more advanced 
costing practices. These descriptive and comparative studies suggest that 
the same techniques are used variably across countries.
In this paper, we empirically investigate whether information use in 
inventory production management differs across countries with two country-
level characteristics—country-level management practice and country-level 
shareholder protection.
Inventory Production Management and Control 
Many management control practices and choices directly or indirectly 
influence inventory production and control: just-in-time production, 
budgeting types, lean production, etc. To the extent that these management 
practices and emphases are variably implemented in business, inventory 
production and control can lead to favorable outcomes. Voluminous research 
has generally shown the association between inventory reduction and many 
management tools such as just-in-time and world-class manufacturing and 
the association between reduced inventory and improved earnings and 
market performance (e.g., Fullerton et al,. 2003; Chen et al., 2005; Pong & 
Mitchell, 2012). 
However, improving inventory control can be challenging, and 
inventory management and control can be hindered or facilitated by certain 
accounting information and practices. The traditional absorption accounting 
is often criticized for its incentive to overproduce, and variable accounting is 
the alternative to demotivate inventory overproduction. A useful budget can 
help firms plan production based on demand needs, and good enforcement of 
a budget will reduce the likelihood of overproduction. Firms’ performance 
evaluation based on financial measures provides greater overproduction 
incentives than non-financial measures.
The relationship between overproduction and stock market performance 
has been documented in prior research. In general, the research (e.g., Lev & 
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Thiagarajan, 1993; Abarbanell & Bushee, 1997) shows inventory growth in 
excess of sales growth is negatively correlated with both contemporaneous 
stock returns and future earnings. 
Attempting to explain overproduction incentive, some research 
suggests that overproduction can be opportunistic and is used to increase 
contemporaneous performance (Gupta et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2012; 
Young et al., 2014). Bruggen et al. (2011) also find that inventory buildup 
is associated with lower brand image in an automobile manufacturer. 
However, Jiambalvo et al. (1997) suggest that overproduction on average 
is not opportunistic, but rather a reflection of firms’ inventory buildups in 
expectation of higher future sales, and find that the stock market reacts 
positively to overproduction. 
Thomas and Zhang (2002) document some empirical regularities for 
extreme inventory change firms; for example, firms with inventory increases 
(decreases) experience higher (lower) profitability, growth, and abnormal 
returns over the prior five years, but then reverse after the extreme inventory 
change. Thomas and Zhang (2002) conjecture that the reversal is caused 
by demand shifts; however, such impact is masked by either earnings 
management or variation in production levels changing the allocation weight 
of fixed manufacturing costs into Cost of Goods Sold. 
Overall, prior research findings suggest the existence of inventory 
buildup or imperfect production decision management, but with no 
consensus on the causes. Although earnings management has often been 
offered as a plausible explanation for overproduction, there is an alternative 
possibility that inventory is not well managed to align with the production 
needs due to the managers’ inability to respond to the demand change 
(Gupta, Pevzner & Seethamraju, 2010).
In business management, inventory production should reflect demand 
change. The demand change is dynamic, and achieving demand-supply 
match normally considers the demand change in the past period, in the 
current period, and in the future period. We investigate whether inventory 
production in the current period is more associated with information of the 
past demand or the future demand. We study firms’ inventory production 
in two distinctive patterns: inventory production based on future sales or 
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inventory production based on past sales (or both). Essentially, production 
changes in responding to sales change, and firms could either use projected 
sales change or rely on historical sales change to adjust the production for 
the demand. 
Different from prior studies, we attempt to capture which type of 
management accounting information—past or future—is associated with 
the inventory production decision. According to Zimmerman (2013), 
management accounting practices serve two purposes, decision management 
and management control, and often require a trade-off between the two. 
Decision management emphasizes information precision and planning 
while management control intends to reduce agency conflicts and hence 
prefers verifiable past information. Many management accounting choices, 
particularly inventory production, are a reflection of such consideration and 
balance. For example, when the goal is to control, budgeting is more likely 
to adopt a top-down approach and relies more on verifiable past information. 
On the other hand, when the goal is to make better decision management, 
it is more likely to adopt a bottom-up approach and incorporate future 
information provided by the lower-level managers, who often have the 
special business knowledge to make better projections (Zimmerman, 2013). 
In summary, use of future information is more relevant for decision-making 
while use of past information is more justified in management control. 
Research Question 1: Is current period inventory production 
associated with past period sales change information and future period 
sales change information?
Management Systems and Practices Across Countries
According to Shields et al. (1991), “management accounting is just 
one component of a firm’s total management system, and its role cannot 
be fully understood without considering its organizational context, the 
process whereby it is applied and the goals that management seeks to 
achieve.” Relatedly, management control systems have historical accounting 
origins when researchers attempt to address accounting information 
used for managers (Strauss & Zecher, 2013). For example, Anthony and 
Govindarajan (2006) define management control systems as the process or 
tools used by managers to influence other organization members to achieve 
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the desired goals, which integrate or rely on management accounting to 
provide information. Thus, business management control system and 
practices calls for a compatible design of management accounting system, 
i.e., management accounting design should reflect or assist the demands 
and objectives of business management strategy.
Contingency theory assumes that there is no one best way to structure 
a firm; rather, firms must adapt their structure to fit their environmental 
contingencies (Chenhall, 2003; Gerdin & Greve, 2004, 2008). It is important 
for firms to find the right fit, since lack of alignment between the internal 
needs and external environment will lead to dysfunctional consequences 
(Fry & Smith, 1987; Fullerton et al., 2014). 
A research by two economists (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007, 2010) 
develops a survey method to construct management practice measures in 
three areas: monitoring management, targets management, and incentives 
management. The three measures capture three management aspects of how 
firms control personnel, set the targets, and conduct performance evaluation. 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) show that there are significant cross-country 
and within-country differences in management practices and differences in 
productivity between firms and countries can be explained by variations 
in management practices. These management measures are also strongly 
associated with profitability, Tobin’s Q, and survival rates. Relying on the 
country-level management score in Bloom et al. (2012), we investigate the 
second research question stated as follows. 
Research Question 2: Is the association between firms’ current period 
inventory production and past/future period sales information in countries 
with good management practices different from that in countries with poor 
management practices?
Shareholder Protection Levels Across Countries
Different shareholder protection degrees across countries are often 
used to explain the different accounting information qualities in external 
financial reporting at the country level. However, whether and how the 
degree of shareholder protection affects internal management accounting 
information is still an empirical question and receives little attention. We 
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surmise that shareholder protection affects external accounting information 
and internal accounting information differently based on some anecdotal 
evidence. For example, the US and the UK are two countries with a similar 
level of shareholder protection and hence external reporting qualities are 
similar. However, the UK is often blamed for its low productivity as a result 
of bad management (Bloom & Veenen, 2010), while the US is praised for 
its best management (Bloom et al., 2012). The US, Germany, and Japan 
are three developed countries known for their contributions, advances, and 
achievements in modern management accounting practices but these three 
countries have different levels of shareholder protection. Pond and Mitchell 
(2012) study UK firms’ inventory and find the level of inventory turnover 
is better than the US and Germany, but not as good as Japan. 
Management accounting has developed into the value-based 
management approach that emphasizes the creation of long-term firm value 
for the shareholders (Ittner & Larcker, 2001). The shareholder protection 
mechanism is intended to protect external shareholders from the internal 
agent problems that may hurt shareholders’ interests, and such protection 
in the principal-agent setting can facilitate the adoption and development 
of more effective management accounting practices in the long run. But 
in short-term, shareholder protection emphasis might hinder execution 
of some good management accounting practices when excessive actions/
activities/resources are devoted to protect shareholders, and certain good 
management practices are not considered, postponed, or rejected due to 
interference with the other consideration—protecting shareholders. To our 
knowledge, Bank, Byzalov and Threinen (2013) is the only research that 
links the shareholder protection to some management accounting practices 
and found that strong shareholder protection reduces cost stickiness because 
empire-building behavior by managers is deterred.
Managerial accounting is not only affected by the principal-agent 
problem, but also by an agent-agent problem. Bouillon et al. (2006) show 
that the management control system is less costly and more effective when 
business strategy is based on both alignments of principal-agent and agent-
agent. 
With diversity of governance arrangements around the world, La 
Porta et al. (2000) point out that strong investor protection is associated 
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with effective corporate governance and suggest using investor protection 
as the starting point to describe differences in corporate governance regimes 
across countries. Weak governance and weak shareholder protection of small 
shareholders intensify principal-agent problems and create new agent-agent 
problems (expropriation) (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). 
Along the same line, we examine whether management accounting 
practices, specifically inventory production management, vary contingent 
on the shareholder protection level across countries. So our third question 
is stated as follows.
Research Question 3: Is the association between firms’ current period 
inventory production and past/future period sales information in countries 
with high-level shareholder protection different from that in countries with 
low-level shareholder protection?
MODEL
Previous research (Roychowhury, 2006) on real earnings management 
develops a model to estimate normal production costs and overproduction 
costs as follows.
PROD
t/
TA
t-1
= α0+α1(1/TA
t-1
) + α2(SALESt/TAt-1) + α3(ΔSALESt/TAt-1) + 
α4(ΔSALES
t-1
/TA
t-1
) + εt              (1)
 
In this model, total production, PROD
t/
TA
t-1, 
is the sum of the cost 
of goods sold and the change in inventory during the year scaled by total 
assets at the beginning of the year, SALESt/TAt-1 is total sales scaled by 
total assets at the beginning of the year, ΔSALESt/TAt-1 is current year sales 
change scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year, ΔSALES
t-1
/TA
t-1 
is prior year sales change scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
Overproduction is estimated as the difference between actual production 
costs and estimated normal production costs.
We revise this model based on the managerial accounting approach to 
determine budgeted inventory production in a budgeting process. Production 
budget is projected based on expected sales in the same period adjusted 
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for expected inventory level change. The expected ending inventory is 
maintained to anticipate the sales needs at the start of the following year, 
thus should be related to future sales change. Production costs model is hence 
revised as a function of current period sales and future period sales change, 
a reflection of management accounting practices emphasis on control and 
management in the future. The model is as follows in equation (2):
PROD
t/
TA
t-1
= α0+α1(1/TA
t-1
) + α2(SALESt/TAt-1) + α3(ΔSALESt+1/
TAt1)+εt                 (2)
In equation (2), ΔSALES
t+1 
is change in sales in the next year. Similar 
to equation (1), all variables are scaled by total assets at the beginning of 
the year, TA
t-1
.  
We further revise the model to reflect inventory management based 
on adjacent prior and future period sales changes as in equation (3):
PROD
t/
TA
t-1
=α0+α1(1/TA
t-1
)+α2(SALESt/TAt-1)+α3(ΔSALESt-1/TAt-
1)+α4(ΔSALESt/TAt-1)+ α5(ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1)+εt                   (3)
Equation (3) includes two more variables than equation (2). ΔSALES
t-1 
is change in sales in the last year, and ΔSALESt is change in sales in the 
current year. This is the main model for our empirical test of whether and 
how firms employ past or future sales change information in the production 
decision.
SAMPLE SELECTION
We obtain from Computstat Global all manufacturing firms (SIC codes 
2000-3999) in the period 2005-2013 from twenty countries, Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Sweden, the 
UK, and the US. These twenty countries are chosen because the two country 
level variables used in this study are available for each country.
Final sample consists of 44,793 firm-year observations that have data 
to estimate equations (2) and (3), and with firm level variables not in the 
top and bottom one percent. Table 1 Panel A summarizes the country level 
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variables and the number of observations in each country. The aggregate 
and three component management practice scores are from Bloom et al. 
(2012) and the anti-director rights index is from Djankov et al. (2008). 
Bloom et al. (2012) examines management practices differences across 
countries to explain the different productivity by surveying 9,079 firms from 
twenty countries, and eighteen questions in the questionnaire are designed 
to measure monitoring management, targets management, and incentives 
management. The overall management score is based on the average of 
the above three categories. In general, firms in developing countries tend 
to be poorly managed. Djankov et al. (2008) form the aggregate index of 
shareholder rights by summing: (1) vote by mail; (2) shares not blocked or 
deposited; (3) cumulative voting; (4) oppressed minority; (5) pre-emptive 
rights; and (6) capital. Table 1 Panel B summarizes the descriptive statistics 
of firm-year variables used in equations (2) and (3), mean, standard 
deviation, median, etc.
Table 1: Descriptive of Variables
Panel A: Country Level Variables
Overall 
Management
Monitoring 
Management
Targets 
Management
Incentives 
Management
Anti-director 
rights revised
Number of 
Observations
Argentina 2.76 3.08 2.67 2.56 3 183
Australia 3.02 3.27 3.02 2.75 4 1,466
Brazil 2.71 3.06 2.69 2.55 5 719
Canada 3.17 3.54 3.07 2.94 4 393
Chile 2.83 3.14 2.72 2.67 4 285
China 2.71 2.90 2.62 2.69 1 7,847
France 3.02 3.41 2.95 2.73 3 1,290
Germany 3.23 3.57 3.21 2.98 2.5 1,536
Greece 2.73 2.97 2.65 2.58 2 474
India 2.67 2.91 2.66 2.63 5 8,256
Italy 3.02 3.25 3.09 2.76 2.5 658
Japan 3.23 3.50 3.34 2.92 3.5 7,614
Mexico 2.92 3.29 2.89 2.71 3 215
New Zealand 2.93 3.18 2.96 2.63 4 155
Poland 2.90 3.12 2.94 2.83 2 884
Portugal 2.87 3.27 2.83 2.59 2.5 77
Rep. of Ireland 2.89 3.14 2.81 2.79 4 89
Sweden 3.20 3.63 3.18 2.83 3.5 876
UK 3.02 3.32 2.97 2.85 5 1,896
US 3.35 3.57 3.25 3.25 3 9,880
Total 44,793
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Final sample consists of manufacturing firms with SIC code between 
2000 and 3999. All observations are required to have cost of goods sold, 
sales and inventory change data. The extreme 1% of cost of goods sold/
total assets, and sales/total assets observations in each country are deleted.
The four management practice scores are from Bloom et al. (2012) 
and anti-director rights index is from Djankov et al. (2008).
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Level Variables 
Mean Std Min Median Max N
PRODt /TAt-1 0.7145 0.5102 -0.1983 0.6146 4.7807 44,793
SALESt/TAt-1 1.0045 0.5830 0.0000 0.9213 4.7516 44,793
ΔSALESt-1/TAt-1 -0.0191 6.0978 -684.42 0.0619 1.2219 44,793
ΔSALESt/TAt-1 0.0860 0.2593 -1.6145 0.0552 2.5470 44,793
ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1 0.0905 0.3149 -1.5280 0.0417 4.1180 44,793
PROD
t/
TA
t-1, 
is the sum of the cost of goods sold and the change in 
inventory during the year scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
SALESt/TAt-1 is total sales scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
year. ΔSALES
t-1
/TA
t-1 
is prior year sales change scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the year. ΔSALESt/TAt-1 is current year sales change scaled 
by total assets at the beginning of the year. ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1 
is future year 
sales change scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
RESULTS
We first estimate equations (2) and (3) with fixed country and industry 
effect for the entire final sample, and the results are shown in Table 2. The 
estimated coefficient on SALESt/TAt-1 is significant in both regressions. The 
estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1
 is 0.0547 (t=14.69) in equation (2) 
regression and 0.0503 (t=13.42) in equation (3) regression, respectively. The 
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estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t-1
/TA
t-1
 is not significant and the estimated 
coefficient on ΔSALESt/TAt-1 is significantly positive (0.0456, t=8.82) in 
equation (3). The results suggest that production in general is not associated 
with the past period sales change and positively associated with the future 
period sales change. Thus, for research question 1, we find that the future 
period sales change appears to play a bigger role than the past period sales 
change in inventory production.
Table 2: Results of Regressing Production Costs on Past, 
Current, and Future Periods Sales Changes
PRODt/TAt-1=α0+α1(1/TAt-1)+α2(SALESt/TAt-1)+α3(ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1)+ εt  (2)
PRODt/TAt-1=α0+α1(1/TAt-1)+α2(SALESt/TAt-1)+α3(ΔSALESt-1/TAt-1)+ α4(ΔSALESt/
TAt-1)+ α5(ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1)+εt   (3)
Dep= PRODt/TAt-1 Dep= PRODt/TAt-1
1/TAt-1 0.0511*** 0.0506***
(15.19) (15.06)
SALESt/TAt-1 0.7457*** 0.7357***
(355.01) (308.32)
ΔSALESt-1/TAt-1 -0.0001
(0.44)
ΔSALESt/TAt-1 0.0456***
(8.82)
ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1 0.0547*** 0.0503***
(14.69) (13.42)
Adj. R2 0.7896 0.6682
N 44,793 44,793
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent levels for a two-tailed test.
The results are based on estimating regressions with fixed country and industry effect.
The variables are described as in Table 1.
To examine research question 2, we use the median of country level 
total management practice score (Bloom et al. 2012) to partition the final 
sample into two sub-samples, and estimate equation (2) and equation (3) 
for each sub-sample with high or low management practice score. We 
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estimate the two equations with country and industry fixed effect and the 
results are reported in Table 3 Panel A.  For firms in countries with low 
management practice score, the estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1
 is 
0.0347 (t=9.51) in equation (2) regression and 0.0331 (t=8.99) in equation 
(3) regression, respectively. For firms in countries with high management 
practice score, the estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1
 is 0.0259 
(t=4.11) in equation (2) regression and 0.0238 (t=3.75) in equation (3) 
regression. Thus, the low total management score firms appear to have 
higher estimated coefficient on the future sales growth variable than the 
high total management score firms. However, we do not find this difference 
is significant (t=1.25, p= 0.2596, untabulated). 
  
Panel A also shows that in Equation (3), the estimated coefficient on 
ΔSALESt/TAt-1 is significantly positive in both sub-samples, 0.0207 (t=3.55) 
in low score sub-sample and 0.0157 (t=0.0157) in high score sub-sample, 
respectively. The results are mixed for ΔSALES
t-1
/TA
t-1
 with a significantly 
negative estimated coefficient for the high management score sub-sample 
-0.0343 (t=4.55) and an insignificant estimated coefficient -0.0001 (t=0.93) 
for the low management score sub-sample.  
Table 3: Results of Regressing Production Costs on Past, 
Current and Future Periods Sales Changes for Samples 
with Different Levels of Management Scores
PRODt/TAt-1=α0+α1(1/TAt-1)+α2(SALESt/TAt-1)+α3(ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1)+ εt  (2)
PRODt/TAt-1=α0+α1(1/TAt-1)+α2(SALESt/TAt-1)+α3(ΔSALESt-1/TAt-1)+ α4(ΔSALESt/
TAt-1)+ α5(ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1)+εt   (3)
Panel A: Sample Partitioned by Total Management Score
Low Total 
Management
Low Total 
Management
High Total 
Management
High Total 
Management
1/TAt-1 -0.0541 -0.0576 0.0491*** 0.0483***
(0.69) (0.74) (13.03) (12.81)
SALESt/TAt-1 0.8492*** 0.8437*** 0.6449*** 0.6448***
(385.67) (313.28) (195.95) (179.46)
ΔSALESt-1/TAt-1 -0.0001 -0.0342***
(0.93) (4.55)
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ΔSALESt/TAt-1 0.0207*** 0.0157**
(3.55) (2.05)
ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1 0.0347*** 0.0331*** 0.0259*** 0.0238***
(9.51) (8.99) (4.11) (3.75)
Adj. R2 0.9111 0.9111 0.6681 0.6682
N 19,029 19,029 25,764 25,764
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent levels for a two-tailed test.
The results are based on estimating regressions with fixed country and industry effect for the sample partitioned by median 
total management score.
The variables are described as in Table 1.
Panel B: Sample Partitioned by Monitoring Management Score
Low 
Monitoring 
Management
Low 
Monitoring 
Management
High 
Monitoring 
Management
High 
Monitoring 
Management
1/TAt-1 0.1533*** 0.1520*** 0.0488*** 0.0480***
(3.70) (3.67) (12.89) (12.67)
SALESt/TAt-1 0.8468*** 0.8408*** 0.6445*** 0.6448***
(383.12) (311.76) (193.94) (177.79)
ΔSALESt-1/TAt-1 -0.0001 -0.0352***
(0.88) (4.64)
ΔSALESt/TAt-1 0.0226*** 0.0140*
(3.89) (1.81)
ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1 0.0364*** 0.0346*** 0.0236*** 0.0217***
(9.93) (9.35) (3.70) (3.38)
Adj. R2 0.9083 0.9084 0.6673 0.6676
N 19,550 19,550 25,243 25,243
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent levels for a two-tailed test.
The results are based on estimating regressions with fixed country and industry effect for the sample partitioned by median 
monitoring management score.
The variables are described as in Table 1.
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Panel C: Sample Partitioned by Targets Management Score
Low Targets 
Management
Low Targets 
Management
High Targets 
Management
High Targets 
Management
1/TAt-1 -0.0540 -0.0576 0.0491*** 0.0483***
(0.69) (0.74) (13.03) (12.81)
SALESt/TAt-1 0.8492*** 0.8437*** 0.6449*** 0.6449***
(385.67) (313.28) (195.95) (179.46)
ΔSALESt-1/TAt-1 -0.0001 -0.0342***
(0.93) (4.55)
ΔSALESt/TAt-1 0.0207*** 0.0157**
(3.55) (2.05)
ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1 0.0347*** 0.0331*** 0.0259*** 0.0238***
(9.51) (8.99) (4.11) (3.75)
Adj. R2 0.9110 0.9111 0.6681 0.6684
N 19,029 19,029 25,764 25,764
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent levels for a two-tailed test.
The results are based on estimating regressions with fixed country and industry effect for the sample partitioned by median 
targets management score.
The variables are described as in Table 1.
Panel D: Sample Partitioned by Incentives Management Score
Low 
Incentives 
Management
Low 
Incentives 
Management
High 
Incentives 
Management
High 
Incentives 
Management
1/TAt-1 0.3394*** 0.3382*** 0.0484** 0.0475***
(7.90) (7.88) (12.83) (12.60)
SALESt/TAt-1 0.8389*** 0.8311*** 0.6550*** 0.6538***
(365.79) (298.52) (199.36) (181.23)
ΔSALESt-1/TAt-1 -0.0001 -0.0333***
(0.78) (4.50)
ΔSALESt/TAt-1 0.0302*** 0.0214***
(4.93) (2.82)
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ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1 0.0410*** 0.0385*** 0.0250*** 0.0222***
(10.53) (9.82) (4.08) (3.62)
Adj. R2 0.9018 0.9019 0.6786 0.6789
N 19,501 19,501 25,292 25,292
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent levels for a two-tailed test.
The results are based on estimating regressions with fixed country and industry effect for the sample partitioned by median 
incentives management score.
The variables are described as in Table 1.
Further, we partition the sample alternatively based on the three 
components of management practice scores (Bloom et al., 2012), i.e., the 
median of monitoring management, targets management, or incentives 
management, and compare the results for high and low score sub-samples. 
The results are presented in Panel B, C, D in Table 3. The results all have 
the same pattern as in Panel A. Overall, the positive estimated coefficient on 
ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1
 suggest that firms rely on future sales change information 
to schedule production, and the reliance is a little higher in firms located in 
low management practice countries. The estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t-1
/
TA
t-1
 is quite different for the two sub-samples, negative for the firms from 
high management score countries and not significant for the firms from low 
management score countries.
In the previous discussion, accounting for management control prefers 
past information while accounting for decision-making prefers future 
information. Although we are unable to determine the individual and relative 
importance of management control and decision-making in every country, 
the Bloom et al. (2012) management practice measure does appear to be 
more focused on the role of management control. The results in Table 3 
corroborates with our discussion in that the high management score sub-
sample reports a lower estimated coefficient on the future information than 
the low management score sub-sample, and only the high management score 
sub-sample has a significant estimated coefficient on the past information.
To investigate research question 3, we partition the sample based on 
the median of anti-director rights index. For each sub-sample, we estimate 
equation (2) and (3) with fixed country and industry effect, and the results 
are presented in Table 4. For firms in countries with low anti-director rights 
index, the estimated coefficient on the ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1
 is 0.0458 (t=7.48) 
in equation (2); the estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t-1
/TA
t-1
 is -0.0330 
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(t=3.88), the estimated coefficient on ΔSALESt/TAt-1 is 0.0581 (t=7.08), 
and the estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1
is 0.0396 (t=6.41) in 
equation (3) regression. For firms in countries with high anti-director rights 
index, the estimated coefficient on the ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1
 is 0.0568 (t=13.96) 
in equation (2); the estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t-1
/TA
t-1
 is -0.0001 
(t=0.61), the estimated coefficient on ΔSALESt/TAt-1 is 0.0298 (t=5.08), and 
the estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1
is 0.0541 (t=13.18) in equation 
(3) regression. The results show that in both samples, the production costs 
are positively associated with current period sales growth ΔSALESt/TAt-1 
and future period sales growth ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1
, but the association between 
the production costs and past period sales growth ΔSALES
t-1
/TA
t-1
 is mixed 
(i.e., significantly negative in the low shareholder protection sub-sample 
but insignificant in the high shareholder protection sub-sample). Also, 
between the two different samples, the high shareholder protection firms 
appear to have a greater reliance on the future sales growth (higher estimated 
coefficient on ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1
) than the low shareholder protection firms, 
and untabulated results show that this difference is significant (t=1.94, 
p=0.0522).
Table 4: Results of Regressing Production Costs on Past, 
Current and Future Periods Sales Changes for Samples 
with Different Levels of Shareholder Protection
PRODt/TAt-1=α0+α1(1/TAt-1)+α2(SALESt/TAt-1)+α3(ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1)+ εt  (2)
PRODt/TAt-1=α0+α1(1/TAt-1)+α2(SALESt/TAt-1)+α3(ΔSALESt-1/TAt-1)+ α4(ΔSALESt/
TAt-1)+ α5(ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1)+εt   (3)
Low 
Shareholder 
Protection
Low 
Shareholder 
Protection
High 
Shareholder 
Protection
High 
Shareholder 
Protection
1/TAt-1 0.0566*** 0.0557*** 0.0192*** 0.0187***
(13.32) (13.14) (2.89) (2.82)
SALESt/TAt-1 0.6937*** 0.6846*** 0.7971*** 0.7905***
(201.24) (172.27) (346.28) (298.84)
ΔSALESt-1/TAt-1 -0.0330*** -0.0001
(3.88) (0.61)
ΔSALESt/TAt-1 0.0581*** 0.0298***
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(7.08) (5.08)
ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1 0.0458** 0.0396*** 0.0568*** 0.0541***
(7.48) (6.42) (13.96) (13.18)
Adj. R2 0.6954 0.6963 0.8821 0.8823
N 23,044 23,044 21,749 21,749
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent levels for a two-tailed test.
The results are based on estimating regressions with fixed country and industry effect for the sample partitioned by median 
shareholder protection.
The variables are described as in Table 1.
Overall, the results presented in Table 3 and 4 suggest that, although 
firms in different countries all rely on the future sales information in the 
production decision, the degree of reliance on the future sales change 
information is slightly different. Firms in poor management score 
countries give more weight to the future information than the firms in high 
management score countries, and firms in high level shareholder protection 
countries tend to rely more on the future sales information than firms in 
low level shareholder protection countries. Regarding the use of past sales 
change information, only firms in good management score country or in low 
level shareholder protection countries experience the negative association 
between production costs the past period sales change.
To further investigate research question 2 and 3, we estimate equation 
(3) and tabulate the estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1
, ΔSALESt/
TA
t-1
, and ΔSALES
t-1
/TA
t-1
 in a two-by-two matrix based on low or high 
shareholder protection and low or high total management score. The results 
are reported in Table 5.
Table 5 Panel A compares the estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t+1
/
TA
t-1
. In the sub-sample of low total management score and low level 
shareholder protection countries, the estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t+1
/
TA
t-1
 is -0.0032 (t=0.60). In the sub-sample with high total management 
score and low level shareholder protection, the estimated coefficient on 
ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1
 is 0.0352 (t=3.58). In the sub-sample with low total 
management score and high level shareholder protection, the estimated 
coefficient on ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1
 is 0.0534 (t=10.56). In the sub-sample with 
high total management score and high level shareholder protection, the 
estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1
 is 0.0051 (t=0.74). The results 
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show the estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t+1
/TA
t-1
 is significant only in two 
cells, i.e., the combination of the low shareholder protection and high total 
management and the combination of the high level shareholder protection 
and low total management. The insignificant estimated coefficient in the 
high shareholder protection degree and high total management score sub-
sample suggest that the two institutional country variables do not influence 
firms’ information preference in the same manner.
Table 5 Panel B compares the estimated coefficient on ΔSALESt/TAt-1. 
In the sub-sample of low total management score and low level shareholder 
protection countries, the estimated coefficient on ΔSALESt/TAt-1 is -0.0115 
(t=1.34). In the sub-sample with high total management score and low 
level shareholder protection, the estimated coefficient on ΔSALESt/TAt-1 is 
0.0425 (t=3.60). In the sub-sample with low total management score and 
high level shareholder protection, the estimated coefficient on ΔSALESt/
TA
t-1
 is 0.0370 (t=4.61). In the sub-sample with high total management 
and high level shareholder protection score, the estimated coefficient on 
ΔSALESt/TAt-1 is -0.0271 (t=3.27). 
Table 5 Panel C compares the estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t-1
/TA
t-1
. 
In the sub-sample of low total management score and low level shareholder 
protection countries, the estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t-1
/TA
t-1
 is -0.0998 
(t=10.69). In the sub-sample with high total management score and low 
level shareholder protection, the estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t-1
/TA
t-1
 
is -0.0450 (t=3.74). In the sub-sample with low total management score and 
high level shareholder protection, the estimated coefficient on ΔSALES
t-1
/
TA
t-1
 is -0.0000 (t=0.79). In the sub-sample with high total management 
score and high level shareholder protection, the estimated coefficient on 
ΔSALES
t-1
/TA
t-1
 is -0.0230 (t=2.96). 
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Table 5: Summary of Regression Results of Estimated Coefficient on 
ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1,  ΔSALESt/TAt-1, and ΔSALESt-1/TAt-1in Equation (3) for Low/
High Management Score and Shareholder Protection Level Combinations
Panel A: Estimated Coefficient on ΔSALESt+1/TAt-1,  
Low Total 
Management
High Total 
Management
Low Shareholder 
Protection
-0.0032
(t=0.60)
N=9,680
0.0352***
(t=3.58)
N=13,364
0.0396***
(t=6.42)
N=23,044
High Shareholder 
Protection
0.0534***
(t=10.56)
N=9,349
0.0051
(t=0.74)
N=12,400
0.0541***
(t=13.18)
N=21,749
0.0331***
(t=8.99)
N=19,029
0.0238***
(t=3.75)
N=25,764
Panel B: Estimated Coefficient on ΔSALESt/TAt-1  
Low Total 
Management
High Total 
Management
Low Shareholder 
Protection
-0.0115
(t=1.34)
N=9,680
0.0425***
(t=3.60)
N=13,364
0.0581***
(t=7.08)
N=23,044
High Shareholder 
Protection
0.0370***
(t=4.61)
N=9,349
-0.0271***
(t=3.27)
N=12,400
0.0298***
(t=5.08)
N=21,749
0.0207***
(t=3.55)
N=19,029
0.0157**
(t=2.05)
N=25,764
Panel C: Estimated Coefficient on ΔSALESt-1/TAt-1  
Low Total 
Management
High Total 
Management
Low Shareholder 
Protection
-0.0998***
(t=10.69)
N=9,680
-0.0450***
(t=3.74)
N=13,364
-0.0330***
(t=3.88)
N=23,044
High Shareholder 
Protection
-0.0000
(t=0.79)
N=9,349
-0.023***
(t=2.96)
N=12,400
-0.0000
(t=0.61)
N=21,749
-0.0001
(t=0.93)
N=19,029
-0.0342***
(t=4.55)
N=25,764
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent levels for a two-tailed test.
The results are based on estimating regressions with fixed country and industry effect for the sample partitioned by median 
total management score and median shareholder protection rights.
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CONCLUSION 
This study investigates the association between inventory production 
and sales change information in an international context. Using twenty 
countries with different management control practice scores and shareholder 
protection degrees, we show that although future sales information are 
generally associated with current period inventory production, the degree of 
such association differs across firms with different country characteristics. 
This study attempts to use cross-sectional data to learn what firms do 
internally and how it varies across countries. A future field research on this 
subject in a real world business will be an interesting addition. In addition, 
the results inference is limited by the fact that we are not able to obtain 
the budgeted future sales numbers and instead use the actual future sales 
as a proxy. 
 
A few extensions can be conducted in the future. For example, we can 
further study whether production decision precision, i.e., overproduction is 
related to the interaction between the type of (past or future) information 
used and the country level variables. Future research can also extend to 
compare whether there is a difference in information used in short-term 
production and long-term production.
We can also extend this research to other accounting information and 
other management accounting practices. There are other contexts where 
firms have the option to use either past or future accounting information in 
the management accounting practices. For example, Shields et al. (1991) 
show that Japanese firms focus on future performance while US firms rely 
on currently attainable and average past performance to set standards.  
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